A comprehensive spectrum trading scheme based on market competition, reputation and buyer specific requirements
- Hassan, Md Rakib, Karmakar, Gour, Kamruzzaman, Joarder, Srinivasan, Bala
- Authors: Hassan, Md Rakib , Karmakar, Gour , Kamruzzaman, Joarder , Srinivasan, Bala
- Date: 2015
- Type: Text , Journal article
- Relation: Computer Networks Vol. 84, no. (2015), p. 17-31
- Full Text:
- Reviewed:
- Description: In the exclusive-use model of spectrum trading, cognitive radio devices or secondary users can buy spectrum resources from licensed users or primary users for a short or long period of time. Considering such spectrum access, a trading model is introduced where a buyer can select a set of candidate sellers based on their reputation and their offers in fulfilling its requirements, namely, offered signal quality, contract duration, coverage and bandwidth. Similarly, a seller can assess a buyer as a potential trading partner considering the buyer's reliability, which the seller can derive from the buyer's reputation and financial profile. In our scheme, seller reputation or buyer reliability can be either obtained from a reputation brokerage service, if one exists, or calculated using our model. Since in a competitive market, the price of a seller depends on that of other sellers, game theory is used to model the competition among multiple sellers. An optimization technique is used by a buyer to select the best seller(s) and optimize purchase to maximize its utility. This may result in buying from multiple sellers of certain amount of bandwidth from each, depending on price and meeting requirements and budget constraints. Stability of the model is analyzed and performance evaluation shows that it benefits sellers and buyers in terms of profit and throughput, respectively. © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
- Authors: Hassan, Md Rakib , Karmakar, Gour , Kamruzzaman, Joarder , Srinivasan, Bala
- Date: 2015
- Type: Text , Journal article
- Relation: Computer Networks Vol. 84, no. (2015), p. 17-31
- Full Text:
- Reviewed:
- Description: In the exclusive-use model of spectrum trading, cognitive radio devices or secondary users can buy spectrum resources from licensed users or primary users for a short or long period of time. Considering such spectrum access, a trading model is introduced where a buyer can select a set of candidate sellers based on their reputation and their offers in fulfilling its requirements, namely, offered signal quality, contract duration, coverage and bandwidth. Similarly, a seller can assess a buyer as a potential trading partner considering the buyer's reliability, which the seller can derive from the buyer's reputation and financial profile. In our scheme, seller reputation or buyer reliability can be either obtained from a reputation brokerage service, if one exists, or calculated using our model. Since in a competitive market, the price of a seller depends on that of other sellers, game theory is used to model the competition among multiple sellers. An optimization technique is used by a buyer to select the best seller(s) and optimize purchase to maximize its utility. This may result in buying from multiple sellers of certain amount of bandwidth from each, depending on price and meeting requirements and budget constraints. Stability of the model is analyzed and performance evaluation shows that it benefits sellers and buyers in terms of profit and throughput, respectively. © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Internet of vehicles for e-health applications : a potential game for optimal network capacity
- Lin, Din, Tang, Yu, Labeau, Fabrice, Yao, Yuanzhe, Imran, Muhammad, Vasilakos, Athanasios
- Authors: Lin, Din , Tang, Yu , Labeau, Fabrice , Yao, Yuanzhe , Imran, Muhammad , Vasilakos, Athanasios
- Date: 2017
- Type: Text , Journal article
- Relation: IEEE Systems Journal Vol. 11, no. 3 (2017), p. 1888-1896
- Full Text:
- Reviewed:
- Description: Wireless technologies are pervasive to support ubiquitous healthcare applications. However, a critical issue of using wireless communications under a healthcare scenario rests at the electromagnetic interference (EMI) caused by RF transmission, and a high level of EMI may lead to a critical malfunction of medical sensors. In view of EMI on medical sensors, we propose a power control algorithm under a noncooperative game theoretic framework to schedule data transmission. Our objective is to ensure that the noncooperative game of power control can achieve a network-level objective - the optimal network capacity, although the wireless users are selfish and only interested in optimizing their own channel capacity. To obtain this objective, we show that our proposed noncooperative game is a potential game and propose the best-response-dynamics algorithm which can ensure that the game strategy of each user is induced to the optimal solution to the problem of network-level optimal capacity. Numerical results illustrate that the proposed algorithm can achieve an enhancement of 8% of network performance than the existing algorithm against the variations of mobile hospital environments. © 2007-2012 IEEE.
- Authors: Lin, Din , Tang, Yu , Labeau, Fabrice , Yao, Yuanzhe , Imran, Muhammad , Vasilakos, Athanasios
- Date: 2017
- Type: Text , Journal article
- Relation: IEEE Systems Journal Vol. 11, no. 3 (2017), p. 1888-1896
- Full Text:
- Reviewed:
- Description: Wireless technologies are pervasive to support ubiquitous healthcare applications. However, a critical issue of using wireless communications under a healthcare scenario rests at the electromagnetic interference (EMI) caused by RF transmission, and a high level of EMI may lead to a critical malfunction of medical sensors. In view of EMI on medical sensors, we propose a power control algorithm under a noncooperative game theoretic framework to schedule data transmission. Our objective is to ensure that the noncooperative game of power control can achieve a network-level objective - the optimal network capacity, although the wireless users are selfish and only interested in optimizing their own channel capacity. To obtain this objective, we show that our proposed noncooperative game is a potential game and propose the best-response-dynamics algorithm which can ensure that the game strategy of each user is induced to the optimal solution to the problem of network-level optimal capacity. Numerical results illustrate that the proposed algorithm can achieve an enhancement of 8% of network performance than the existing algorithm against the variations of mobile hospital environments. © 2007-2012 IEEE.
The determinants of cluster activities in the Australian wine and tourism industries
- Taylor, Peter, McRae-Williams, Pamela, Lowe, Julian
- Authors: Taylor, Peter , McRae-Williams, Pamela , Lowe, Julian
- Date: 2007
- Type: Text , Journal article
- Relation: Tourism Economics Vol. 13, no. 4 (2007), p. 639-656
- Full Text:
- Reviewed:
- Description: This paper discusses wine and tourism clusters and the recent innovation of wine tourism in which businesses operate within both industries. The concept of micro-clusters is examined in terms of trust, networking, collaboration and other activities, all of which are argued to depend on the concepts of game theory and sunk costs. The study involved both interviews and a questionnaire. Conceptual variables are created from the questionnaire responses using factor analysis. The determinants of cluster activities are modelled using regression analysis. The effects of industry, place and respondents' entrepreneurial characteristics are used as exogenous variables. The study finds that industry does seem to be more important than place in the determination of networking and cooperative cluster activities, and that members of the wine tourism industry participate more in these activities than members of the tourism or hospitality industries. The addition of three variables that embody the entrepreneurial characteristics of the respondents approximately doubles the explanatory power of the original models. There is evidence to suggest that cluster activities are idiosyncratic for each industry-place cluster. The effects of firm size on cluster activities are also examined. No evidence is found of cooperative activities depending on cluster size. The main results support the contention that sunk costs are important in the determination of cluster activities.
- Description: C1
- Description: 2003005195
- Authors: Taylor, Peter , McRae-Williams, Pamela , Lowe, Julian
- Date: 2007
- Type: Text , Journal article
- Relation: Tourism Economics Vol. 13, no. 4 (2007), p. 639-656
- Full Text:
- Reviewed:
- Description: This paper discusses wine and tourism clusters and the recent innovation of wine tourism in which businesses operate within both industries. The concept of micro-clusters is examined in terms of trust, networking, collaboration and other activities, all of which are argued to depend on the concepts of game theory and sunk costs. The study involved both interviews and a questionnaire. Conceptual variables are created from the questionnaire responses using factor analysis. The determinants of cluster activities are modelled using regression analysis. The effects of industry, place and respondents' entrepreneurial characteristics are used as exogenous variables. The study finds that industry does seem to be more important than place in the determination of networking and cooperative cluster activities, and that members of the wine tourism industry participate more in these activities than members of the tourism or hospitality industries. The addition of three variables that embody the entrepreneurial characteristics of the respondents approximately doubles the explanatory power of the original models. There is evidence to suggest that cluster activities are idiosyncratic for each industry-place cluster. The effects of firm size on cluster activities are also examined. No evidence is found of cooperative activities depending on cluster size. The main results support the contention that sunk costs are important in the determination of cluster activities.
- Description: C1
- Description: 2003005195
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