- Title
- Can a powerful CEO avoid involuntary replacement? - An empirical study from China
- Creator
- Lowe, Julian; Pi, Lili
- Date
- 2009
- Type
- Text; Journal article
- Identifier
- http://researchonline.federation.edu.au/vital/access/HandleResolver/1959.17/65288
- Identifier
- vital:4435
- Identifier
- ISSN:1572-9958
- Abstract
- This study examines the impact of CEO power on forced CEO turnover from five perspectives, namely firm performance, structural power, ownership power, CEOs’ political connections, and tenure power. Using panel data of listed companies in China, this study finds that firm performance has negative effects on forced CEO turnover. Similarly, CEOs’ structural power, political connections, and tenure power can increase their ability to be insulated from involuntary replacement. In addition, two factors of CEO ownership power, the state-controlling shareholder and serving as the representative of the largest shareholder, appear to be effective in reducing the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.
- Relation
- Asia Pacific Journal of Management Vol. 28, no. 4 (2009), p. 775-805
- Rights
- Copyright Springer
- Rights
- This metadata is freely available under a CCO license
- Subject
- CEO; Forced turnover; Power; Chinese firms
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