Description:
The efference copy account of the tickle effect (i.e., our inability to tickle ourselves) predicts no tickle effect (i.e., an ability to tickle ourselves) when the trajectory of a tactile stimulus is perturbed relative to the associated movement, and there is evidence in support of this. The active inference account, however, predicts the tickle effect should survive trajectory perturbation. We test these accounts of the tickle effect under the hypothesis that previous findings are due to attentional modulation, and that the tickle effect will be found in a paradigm with no conscious attention directed to the trajectory perturbation. We thus expected to find support for active inference. Our first experiment confirms this hypothesis, while our second seeks to explain previous findings in terms of the modulation of the tickle sensation when there is awareness of, and different degrees of attention to, the spatial tactile and kinesthetic trajectories.
Description:
Time judgement and time experience are distinct elements of time perception. It is known that time experience tends to be slow, or dilated, when depressed, but there is less certainty or clarity concerning how depression affects time judgement. Here, we use a Bayesian Prediction Error Minimisation (PEM) framework called 'distrusting the present' as an explanatory and predictive model of both aspects of time perception. An interval production task was designed to probe and modulate the relationship between time perception and depression. Results showed that hopelessness, a symptom of severe depression, was associated with the ordering of interval lengths, reduced overall error, and dilated time experience. We propose that 'distrusting the future' is accompanied by 'trusting the present', leading to the experiences of time dilation when depressed or hopeless. Evidence was also found to support a relative difference model of how hopelessness dilates, and arousal accelerates, the rate of experienced time.
Description:
Time judgement and time experience are distinct elements of time perception. It is known that time experience tends to be slow, or dilated, when depressed, but there is less certainty or clarity concerning how depression affects time judgement. Here, we use a Bayesian Prediction Error Minimisation (PEM) framework called 'distrusting the present' as an explanatory and predictive model of both aspects of time perception. An interval production task was designed to probe and modulate the relationship between time perception and depression. Results showed that hopelessness, a symptom of severe depression, was associated with the ordering of interval lengths, reduced overall error, and dilated time experience. We propose that 'distrusting the future' is accompanied by 'trusting the present', leading to the experiences of time dilation when depressed or hopeless. Evidence was also found to support a relative difference model of how hopelessness dilates, and arousal accelerates, the rate of experienced time.
Description:
The effect of the body transfer illusion on the perceived strength of self- and externally-generated "tickle" sensations was investigated. As expected, externally generated movement produced significantly higher ratings of tickliness than those associated with self-generated movements. Surprisingly, the body transfer illusion had no influence on the ratings of tickliness, suggesting that highly surprising, and therefore hard to predict, experiences of body image and first-person perspective do not abolish the attenuation of tickle sensations. In addition, evidence was found that a version of the rubber hand illusion exists within the body transfer illusion. We situate our findings within the larger debate over sensory attenuation: (1) there is an attenuation of prediction errors that depends upon the context in which sensory input is predicted (i.e., efference copy), and (2) sensory attenuation is a necessary consequence of self-generated movement irrespective of context (i.e., active inference). The results support the notion of active inference.
Description:
In four experiments, blindfolded participants were presented with pairs of stimuli simultaneously, one to each index finger. Participants moved one index finger, which was presented with cutaneous and/or kinesthetic stimuli, and this movement caused a raised line to move underneath the other, stationary index finger in a yoked manner. The stimuli were 180 masculine rotations of each other (e.g., < and >), and thus when a < was traced with the moving finger, it caused a > to be felt at the stationary finger. When asked to report the experience, participants predominantly reported the cutaneous stimulus, seemingly being ignorant of the kinesthetic stimulus. This appears to be an intrahaptic capture phenomenon, which is of interest because it suggests that conflict between intrahaptic sensory stimuli can go unnoticed; sometimes we are unaware of how we moved, and sometimes we do not know what we touched. The results are interpreted in light of optimal integration, perceptual suppression, reafference suppression, and inattentional blindness.
Description:
Introduction: “Body swapping” illusions have been used to explore factors contributing to the experience of “owning” an artificial body. Preliminary research indicated that those people diagnosed with schizophrenia experience more vivid illusions of this kind than do “normal” individuals. Objectives: Here, we explored whether participants who rated themselves “high” on the cognitive-perceptual factor of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) experienced a more compelling sense of immersion in a variation of the body swapping illusion: The Barbie Doll Illusion. We also hypothesised that these individuals would experience a change in size perception when immersed in the illusion. Method: Forty-four participants wore a pair of Head-Mounted Display goggles connected to a video-camera, and thus a doll’s body replaced their own body in their visual field. In two conditions, touch was either applied synchronously or asynchronously to the doll’s and each participant’s leg. After each condition, participants filled out a questionnaire relating to their experience in the illusion. When both conditions were completed, they filled out the SPQ. Results: Our first hypothesis was confirmed, which suggested that people with higher cognitive-perceptual SPQ scores do indeed experience a more compelling Barbie Doll Illusion; however, our second hypothesis was not supported. Conclusion: Our study demonstrated, for the first time, that proneness to the positive and interpersonal factors of schizotypy in a normal population is sufficient to produce a compelling sense of swapping bodies.
Description:
Introduction: “Body swapping” illusions have been used to explore factors contributing to the experience of “owning” an artificial body. Preliminary research indicated that those people diagnosed with schizophrenia experience more vivid illusions of this kind than do “normal” individuals. Objectives: Here, we explored whether participants who rated themselves “high” on the cognitive-perceptual factor of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) experienced a more compelling sense of immersion in a variation of the body swapping illusion: The Barbie Doll Illusion. We also hypothesised that these individuals would experience a change in size perception when immersed in the illusion. Method: Forty-four participants wore a pair of Head-Mounted Display goggles connected to a video-camera, and thus a doll’s body replaced their own body in their visual field. In two conditions, touch was either applied synchronously or asynchronously to the doll’s and each participant’s leg. After each condition, participants filled out a questionnaire relating to their experience in the illusion. When both conditions were completed, they filled out the SPQ. Results: Our first hypothesis was confirmed, which suggested that people with higher cognitive-perceptual SPQ scores do indeed experience a more compelling Barbie Doll Illusion; however, our second hypothesis was not supported. Conclusion: Our study demonstrated, for the first time, that proneness to the positive and interpersonal factors of schizotypy in a normal population is sufficient to produce a compelling sense of swapping bodies.